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Trends in the Social [Ir]responsibility of
American Multimational Corporations:
Increased Power, Diminished Accountability
Cynthia A. Williams and John M. Conley

Abstract
The purpose of this invited essay is to assess the future of the CSR performance of American multinationals in light of several ongoing trends. These trends include companies’ voluntary
CSR programs and the global self-regulatory standards for responsible company activities that are
developing in almost every industry. Moreover, the decade-long project at the United Nations
to identify multinational companies’ responsibilities with respect to international human rights,
ultimately spearheaded by Special Representative John Ruggie, has for the first time established
global expectations of responsible corporate activity. At the same time, however, legal developments in the United States may be trending in the opposite direction, toward increased power and
diminished accountability for corporations. Two legal developments that highlight this countertrend will frame this discussion. The first, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) recognizes a constitutional right for corporations to give financial support to a wide range of electioneering activities, including by using
corporate funds to pay for and broadcast advertisements for specific candidates for office. The
effect is to allow American companies to further consolidate their already substantial political
power. The second, the opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2011),
aff’d, 569 U.S. , 133 S. Ct.1659(Apr. 17, 2013), denied the possibility of corporate liability
under the Alien Tort Statute for Royal Dutch Shell’s employees’ alleged violations of Nigerian
community members’ international human rights. A 2-1 majority held instead that violations of
international law could only be asserted against natural persons or nations. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and in a decision handed down on April 17, 2013, the Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. The five-Justice opinion of the Court held that the
ATS cannot be used to redress violations of the law of nations that occur outside the territory of
the United States, except in exceptional circumstances not found in Kiobel. Neither the majority
opinion nor the concurrence addressed the corporate liability issue, which means that the Second
Circuit’s ruling on that issue remains the law of the Second Circuit — an important outcome, given
the significance of the Second Circuit as a venue for ATS cases. Taken together, the overall effect
of the Second Circuit’s rejection of corporate liability for human rights violations and the Supreme
Court’s rejection of exterritorial application of the ATS to any defendant, corporate or otherwise,
is the substantial evisceration of companies’ legal accountability for international human rights
violations under the ATS. On a theoretical level, these decisions send mixed messages about corporate personhood and identity. But on a practical level, the two decisions work in unfortunate

concert to increase the already considerable political power of U.S. corporations at home, even as
they reduce the risk of legal accountability for their actions abroad. By doing so, they shrink the
shadow of the law — the threat of “hard” legal regulation — that has been an important incentive
to the adoption of voluntary, ”soft-law” CSR standards. Thus, these legal developments, though
ostensibly unrelated to the voluntary pursuit of CSR activity, may in fact act as a disincentive to
that activity.
KEYWORDS: corporate governance, corporate accountability, corporate constitutional rights,
international human rights, Citizens United, Kiobel, Alien Tort Statute, Alien Torts Claims Act

TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL [IR]RESPONSIBILITY OF
AMERICAN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS:
INCREASED POWER, DIMINISHED ACCOUNTABILITY?
Cynthia A. Williams*
John M. Conley**
INTRODUCTION
As we initially considered the invitation to participate in this
symposium, we focused on the word “normative” in the title, and its
root, “norms.” We thought about the question of where the norms of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) come from. One source of CSR
norms is the law. That is, ostensibly voluntary CSR activity can
sometimes be traced to messages being sent—directly or indirectly—
by courts and legislatures. Such messages may fall short of direct
mandates, but nonetheless can have a powerful influence on shaping
corporate behavior in the social and environmental spheres. These
considerations led us ultimately to focus on two cases that are not
routinely discussed in the CSR context but which, we think, may be
sending important messages that could undercut CSR in American
multinationals.
The specific purpose of this essay is to assess the future of the CSR
performance of American multinationals in light of several ongoing
trends. These trends (which we and several colleagues have explored
in detail in previous writings1) include companies’ voluntary CSR
* Osler Chair in Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
** William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, the University of North Carolina
School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams & Ruth V. Aguilera, Corporate Social
Responsibility in a Comparative Perspective, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 452 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008); John
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programs and, relatedly, the global self-regulatory standards for
responsible company activities that are developing in almost every
industry.2 These voluntary efforts have no doubt improved the lives
and working conditions of many people throughout the world within
multinational corporations’ supply chains and other areas of
influence. Moreover, the decade-long project at the United Nations to
identify multinational companies’ responsibilities with respect to
international human rights, ultimately spearheaded by Special
Representative John Ruggie, has for the first time established global
expectations of responsible corporate activity.3
At the same time, however, legal developments in the United
States may be trending in the opposite direction, toward increased
power and diminished accountability for corporations. Two legal
developments that highlight this counter-trend will frame this
discussion. The first, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission (FEC),4 recognized a constitutional
right for corporations to give financial support to a wide range of
electioneering activities, including by using corporate funds to pay
for and broadcast advertisements for specific candidates for office.5
The effect is to allow American companies to further consolidate
their already substantial political power.
The second, the opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I),6
M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed and Embellish: Theory Versus
Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Engage]; Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an
Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002), reprinted in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW, THEORY AND POLICY 30 (Thomas W. Joo ed.,
2004); John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Global Banks as Global
Sustainability Regulators?: The Equator Principles, 33 L. & POL’Y 542 (2011)
[hereinafter Global Banks].
2. Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 329 (2008).
3. U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT,
RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
4. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
5. See id. at 365–67.
6. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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denied the possibility of corporate liability under the ancient Alien
Tort Statute (ATS; the statute is also referred to as the Alien Tort
Claims Act)7 for Royal Dutch Shell’s employees’ alleged violations
of Nigerian community members’ international human rights.8 A 2-1
majority held instead that violations of international law could only
be asserted against natural persons.9 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and heard oral argument on February 28, 2012, and then
reargument on October 1, 2012 on the separate issue of the
extraterritorial reach of the ATS.10 In a decision handed down on
April 17, 2013, the Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the
Second Circuit (Kiobel II).11 The five-Justice opinion of the Court
held only that the ATS cannot be used to redress violations of the law
of nations that occur outside the territory of the United States, except
in exceptional circumstances not found in Kiobel. A concurrence by
Justice Breyer signed by three others disagreed with the breadth of
the Court’s statement of the non-extraterritoriality doctrine, but
agreed that the ATS was unavailable on the facts of this case. Neither
opinion addressed the corporate liability issue, which means that the
Second Circuit’s ruling on that issue remains the law of the Second
Circuit—an important outcome, given the significance of the Second
Circuit as a venue for ATS cases.12 Taken together, the overall effect
of the Second Circuit’s rejection of corporate liability for human
7.
8.
9.
10.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
See Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 145.
See id. at 149.
Certiorari was granted on October 17, 2011 in conjunction with another
case, Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority. 132 S. Ct. 454 (2011). In the second case,
the plaintiff alleged that two organizations, the Palestinian Authority and the
Palestine Liberation organization, had tortured and killed the plaintiff’s decedent.
The case presented the question of whether organizations as juridical persons are
proper defendants in cases brought pursuant to the Torture Victims Protection Act,
(TVPA), a statute passed in 1991. The language of the TVPA uses the term
“individual” rather than “person,” creating a civil damages remedy against “[a]n
individual, who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation . . . subjects an individual to torture . . . or . . . extrajudicial killing . . . .” 28
U.S.C. § 1350, note § 2(a)(1)–(2) (emphases added). In a decision last year, while
Kiobel was awaiting reargument, the Court held unanimously that the term
“individual” means only natural persons, and does not encompass organizations.
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012).
11. Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
12. See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
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rights violations and the Supreme Court’s rejection of exterritorial
application of the ATS to any defendant, corporate or otherwise, is
the substantial evisceration of companies’ legal accountability for
international human rights violations under the ATS.
On a theoretical level, these decisions send mixed messages about
corporate personhood and identity. But on a practical level, the two
decisions work in unfortunate concert to increase the already
considerable political power of U.S. corporations at home, even as
they reduce the risk of legal accountability for their actions abroad.
By doing so, they shrink the shadow of the law—the threat of “hard”
legal regulation—that has been an important incentive to the
adoption of voluntary, “soft-law” CSR standards. Thus, these legal
developments, though ostensibly unrelated to the voluntary pursuit of
CSR activity, may in fact act as a disincentive to that activity.
The structure of this essay is straightforward. First, the Citizens
United decision will be described and then evaluated in the contexts
of constitutional law and theory and existing corporate law doctrine.
Second, the various levels of Kiobel will be described and discussed.
In contrast to the Second Circuit in Kiobel I, the Courts of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit and for the Seventh Circuit have
recently both held precisely to the contrary, that a corporation, as a
juridical entity, can be held liable for violations of international
human rights law. Those opinions, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.13 and
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,14 will also be discussed and
contrasted to Kiobel I. Third, the CSR implications of Citizens United
and Kiobel I and II, construed together, will be developed.
I. CITIZENS UNITED AND CORPORATE POLITICAL POWER
A. Summary of Citizens United
In Citizens United, a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down
limits under federal law that prohibited corporations or unions from
spending treasury funds to make independent expenditures (not
coordinated with candidates or political parties) on “electioneering
communications,” defined as “[a]ny broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for
13. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
14. Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
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Federal office” and is “publicly distributed” within thirty days of a
primary election and sixty days of a general election.15 Both
corporations and unions can establish a Political Action Committee
(PAC) with support from shareholders or employees (in the case of a
corporation), or union members (in the case of a union), in order to
make such expenditures at any time with segregated funds.16 The
Court, however, did not find this option to be a sufficient mechanism
for communication to render the general statutory scheme
constitutional.17
The facts of the case are simple. In 2007 Citizens United produced
a movie called Hillary: The Movie that was critical of thenpresidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Wanting to distribute the
movie broadly, but concerned about potential liability under the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),18 which limits
independent electioneering expenditures (these limits are usually
referred to as section 441b from their codification in 2 U.S.C. §
441b), Citizens United brought an injunctive and declaratory relief
action in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.19 It argued (1) that section 441b was unconstitutional as
applied to Hillary; and (2) that the BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure

15. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320–21 (2010) (interpreting section
203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(2006)).
16. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006). This statute is often referred to as McCainFeingold after its principal Republican and Democratic sponsors in the Senate,
John McCain (R-Arizona) and Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin).
17. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364–66.
18. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28
U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
19. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008).

2013] INCREASED POWER, DIMINISHED ACCOUNTABILITY?

51

requirements20 were unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and to
three ads promoting the movie.21
There were a number of unusual aspects of Citizens United that the
dissent and various commentators have emphasized.22 The claim that
the challenged limitations on corporate electioneering were facially
unconstitutional, that is, could not be constitutional under any
circumstances, had been argued in the alternative in Citizens United’s
original district court pleadings seeking an injunction.23 But that
claim had been specifically abandoned by the plaintiff in its motion
for summary judgment, and both parties had stipulated to its
dismissal,24 so the question was not (under normal procedure)
properly in the case on appeal to the Supreme Court.25 Rather, the
Court sought supplemental briefing and a second round of arguments
to bring the issue forward.26
Moreover, the facts of Citizens United do not involve either a forprofit corporation or a union using treasury funds for electioneering
communications, even though the opinion generally speaks in broad
terms of the constitutional right of a for-profit corporation to make
such expenditures.27 Rather, Citizens United is a non-profit
corporation specifically organized to engage in political activism,
primarily funded by individuals, with a “small portion” of its budget
provided by for-profit corporations. Citizens United has a well20. The disclaimer provision requires identification of the entity funding the
electioneering communication and a clear disclaimer that the communication does
not come from the candidate and has not been approved by the candidate. BCRA §
311, 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2) (2006). The disclosure provision requires any person or
entity making more than $10,000 per year in independent electioneering
expenditures to file a report with the FEC identifying the person making the
expenditure, the amount, the election to which it relates, and identifying certain
large contributors. BCRA § 201, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1) (2006).
21. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321.
22. See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text; infra Part I.B.
23. Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 14–
15, para. 47 Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 072240).
24. See id.; Joint Stipulation at paras. 1–3, id.
25. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 396–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009).
27. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. passim. The opinion equally applies to
unions, but the majority opinion does not emphasize that aspect of its rationale in
any regard.
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funded PAC, which it could have used both to produce the film and
to distribute it at any time;28 instead, it sought to challenge the
restrictions.
The district court, which convened a three-judge panel to hear the
case (as required under the BCRA), denied the injunction,29 and then
granted the FEC’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the
limit on independent electioneering expenditures was facially
constitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2003 precedent McConnell
v. FEC,30 and was constitutional as applied to Hillary under FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.31 since the movie was susceptible to no
other interpretation than that it was advocating against voting for
Hillary Clinton.32 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in
2008,33 and then asked for supplemental briefing and argument in
2009 of whether some or all of the Court’s prior precedents
upholding the constitutionality of these limits on independent
electioneering expenditures (in particular, McConnell and Austin v.
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce) should be overruled.34
An important principle of statutory interpretation in the United
States is, whenever possible, to construe statutes narrowly so as to
avoid constitutional invalidity. Citizens United had advanced a
number of narrowing constructions to suggest that its
communications were not covered by the statute, but none were

28. See id. at 321, 337–38 (discussing types of communications political action
committees can fund).
29. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
30. Id. at 278 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003)
(upholding limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge)).
31. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007) (“[A]
court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if
the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate.”).
32. Citizens United v. FEC, 2008 WL 2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008)
(following its reasoning in Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d. 274).
33. Citizens United v. FEC, 555 U.S. 1028 (2008).
34. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (citing McConnell, 540 U.S.
93 and Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
McConnell had upheld the § 441b limit in a facial challenge on the authority of
Austin, which had found constitutional a state law restriction that mirrored § 441b.
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successful.35 Perhaps the best of these arguments was that the statute
should not be construed to apply to a nonprofit corporation funded
overwhelmingly by individuals and specifically organized to advance
political views, and with only a de minimis amount of corporate
support. The statute itself clearly excludes from its restrictions
ideological nonprofit corporations without corporate support.
Moreover, this construction would have brought the case squarely
within the holding of the Court’s prior decision in FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),36 which exempted
from the section 441b limitations nonprofit corporations that are
formed for the sole purpose of promoting political ideas and do not
accept corporate or union funds.37 The Court rejected this narrowing
argument because, in contrast to the situation in MCFL, a “small
portion” of Citizen United’s budget was from corporate sources.38
Implying a de minimis exception to the statute and MCFL’s holding
would “require[] intricate case-by-case determinations,” which the
Court was reluctant to do, especially where the Court is “convinced
that . . . this corporation has a constitutional right to speak . . . .”39 So,
35. A number of Citizens United’s statutory arguments were (in our view)
untenable. First, Citizens United argued that its movie was not an “electioneering
communication,” because that term had been defined to require potential
communications to over 50,000 people, and Citizen United claimed the relevant
metric should be each individual subscriber who bought access to the movie.
Second, Citizens United claimed that the movie was not express advocacy against
Hillary Clinton, even though it clearly was. Third, Citizens United argued that the
Court should develop a special exception for video on demand, since that
technology was not included in the regulatory definition. Its fourth argument for a
narrowing statutory interpretation is worthy of more discussion, as described
above. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 322–29 (2010) (discussing
Citizens United’s arguments).
36. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
37. Id. at 263–65.
38. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319, 328.
39. Id. at 329. Of course if the Court had recognized a de minimis corporate (or
union) funding exception, then Citizens United would have been allowed to
promote its movie with non-PAC funds even within the thirty day/sixty day time
limit as a nonprofit corporation organized to engage in political advocacy, and
primarily funded by individuals, with de minimis corporate support. That such an
entity, formed specifically to engage in political advocacy and concentrating the
voices of individuals who share its political perspective, should have a
“constitutional right to speak” throughout the election cycle is a position that is not
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concluding that there was no narrower, non-constitutional basis for
making its determination, the Court turned to the constitutionality of
the restriction.
Since political speech is at the core of First Amendment protection,
“an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold
officials accountable to the people,”40 the Court applied strict
scrutiny analysis to section 441b.41 While it first recognized that a
corporation or a union can establish a PAC to engage in precisely the
communications at issue, and thus evade the challenged limits, the
Court held that the regulatory requirements to establish and utilize
such a PAC are too onerous to save section 441b from constitutional
infirmity.42 Nor did the Court find that a compelling governmental
interest was being advanced by the restrictions at issue.43 It
considered three such potential interests, and rejected them in turn:
an anti-distortion interest that had been critical to upholding the
restriction in Austin; an anti-corruption interest that is evident
throughout the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence; and a
shareholder protection interest.44
only required by the holding of MCFL, but one that advances core First
Amendment values. That is quite different from the Court’s actual holding that a
for-profit corporation or union should have the right to use general treasury funds
to promote political views with which at least some of its shareholders, employees
and members undoubtedly disagree, bearing in mind that the statutory provision
struck down in Citizens United only limited corporations’ or unions’ ability to
engage in these types of communications in the immediate month(s) before a
primary or general election—so, if anything, the statute itself was insufficiently
protective of shareholders, employees and union members’ political views.
40. Id. at 339.
41. In U.S. constitutional analysis, if a government regulation restricts a
fundamental right, such as that of free speech, it is subjected to “strict scrutiny.” To
withstand strict scrutiny analysis, such a regulation must advance a compelling
governmental interest and do so utilizing the least restrictive means possible. See
id. at 340.
42. These regulatory requirements include a requirement of separately
organizing the PAC with specified officers, limits on the PAC’s funding sources
(employees, shareholders or union members are the only permissible funders of the
corporation’s or union’s PAC), and quite specific reporting requirements. Id. at
337–38.
43. Id. at 365 (“No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”).
44. Id. at 348–62.
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In Austin, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to use
general treasury funds to express support for a specific candidate for
elected state office even though Michigan law prohibited such
expenditures.45 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
that restriction in 1990, identifying the compelling governmental
interest as preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help
of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”46 The Court in
Citizens United wholly rejected this anti-distortion rationale while
giving little attention to the Austin Court’s other rationales: concerns
about corruption or the appearance of corruption, and protecting
individual shareholders from having corporate money used to support
political candidates whom they opposed.47
The Court construed the anti-distortion rationale as an effort to
provide equal opportunity to speak, and found that goal to be foreign
to the First Amendment.48 If accepted, the Court thought, that
rationale “would permit Government to ban political speech simply
because the speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate
form;”49 it would allow “the Government [to] prohibit a corporation
from expressing political views in media beyond those presented
here, such as by printing books;”50 and it would eviscerate limits in
the statute, such as those exempting media corporations from the
45.
46.
47.
48.

Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654–56 (1990).
Id. at 660, 673.
Id. at 658–59, 663.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 314. U.S. campaign finance laws
limit the amount of money candidates can spend as a condition of accepting
generous federal campaign subsidies that are funded by individual tax-payers
volunteering to contribute extra money when filing their federal tax returns. One
provision of the BCRA that had been invalidated in 2008 increased the limits on
campaign contributions for candidates in races where their opponent had
contributed more than $350,000 of personal funds to their campaign, the so-called
“Millionaire’s Provision.” See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 743–44 (2008). The
Court’s solicitude for wealthy candidates’ ability to use their wealth, and that of
sympathetic PACs, without encountering countervailing spending by publiclyfunded candidates, was on clearest display in Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); see discussion infra in Part I.B.1.
49. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349.
50. Id.
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section 441b limitations. In short, the Court stated, relying the antidistortion rationale of Austin to justify section 441b’s limitations
would “permit[] the Government to ban the political speech of
millions of associations of citizens . . . [and] ‘muffle the voices that
best represent the most significant segments of the economy.’”51
Under this view, all speakers, not just corporations, use money
amassed in the economic marketplace to influence elections.52 In the
Court’s view, preventing corporations from using wealth, gained in
part through the advantages of the corporate form to distort the
electoral process, was an insufficient governmental interest to
support the form of censorship that section 441b imposes.53
The anti-corruption rationale was similarly unpersuasive to the
Court. That rationale has long been the basis for limits on direct
contributions to candidates, including limits on individuals’
contributions as well as those of corporations and unions, and those
limits have consistently been upheld.54 But it has not been extended
to independent electioneering expenditures either in Buckley v. Valeo,
where the rationale was held to be insufficient to support limits on
individuals’ independent electioneering expenditures,55 or in Citizens
United itself.56 The Court in Citizens United relied on the Buckley
rationale, holding that the possibility of corruption is too remote from
independent corporate or union electioneering expenditures, given
that these expenditures by definition are not prearranged or
coordinated with the candidates.57 The Court asserted that:
The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will
not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By
definition, an independent expenditure is political speech
51. Id. at 354 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration to original omitted)).
52. Id. at 351.
53. See id. at 350.
54. Id. at 356–57 (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976)
(upholding limits on individuals’ direct campaign contributions in order to protect
against corruption of the electoral process or quid pro quo contributions by large
individual contributors)).
55. Id. at 357 (discussing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (striking down limits on
individuals’ independent electioneering expenditures)).
56. Id. at 360–61.
57. Id. at 357.
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presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a
candidate. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker,
is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters
presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence
over elected officials.58
The Court dispatched the third asserted governmental interest,
protecting dissenting shareholders from being compelled to support
political speech with which they disagreed, in two paragraphs.59
Protecting this interest would permit banning media corporations
from publishing editorials about different candidates for elected
office, since even one dissenting shareholder holding stock in The
New York Times could be harmed by its editorials.60 If shareholders
are harmed, the Court suggested, the mechanisms of corporate
democracy are sufficient to address that harm.61
Having found no compelling governmental interest promoted by
the ban on a corporation or a union using its treasury funds to make
independent electioneering communications (as opposed to using
separate funds specifically donated by shareholders, employees or
union members for the specific purpose of electioneering, which the
statute clearly allowed), the Court did not need to, and thus did not,
analyze whether section 441b was the least restrictive alternative to
promote that interest. It did, though, need to confront—and
overrule—Austin, which had upheld virtually identical state
restrictions on corporate or union electioneering,62 and portions of
McConnell v. FEC,63 which had upheld section 441b against a facial
challenge.64 The Court found that Austin’s anti-distortion rationale
was not worthy of the respect that stare decisis normally requires,
and it asserted that the government itself did not vigorously defend
the anti-distortion rationale (relying instead on anti-corruption and
58. Id. at 360 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47).
59. See id. at 361–62.
60. See id. at 361–62. See also id. at 351–52 (discussing the potential effects

that the antidistortion rationale could have on political speech by media
corporations).
61. Id. at 361–62.
62. See id. at 365.
63. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
64. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 332.
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shareholder protection rationales). The Court interpreted Austin to be
inconsistent with the previously decided First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, which struck down as unconstitutional restrictions
on corporate spending to influence the results of a referendum, since
“[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too
often simply a means to control content.”65 It also noted that
experience had shown the difficulties that Austin’s holding had
created: “Political speech is so ingrained in our culture that speakers
find ways to circumvent campaign finance laws.”66 The majority thus
overruled Austin, as well as so much of McConnell as had upheld the
section 441b limits against a facial challenge. As the Court
concluded, “[w]e return to the principle . . . that the Government may
not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate
identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”67
The Citizens United majority’s holding and rationale were rejected
in a vigorous dissent written by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor. The essence of the
dissent’s argument is evident in its introductory paragraphs, portions
of which are set out here:
The real issue in this case concerns how, not if, the
appellant may finance its electioneering. Citizens United is
a wealthy nonprofit corporation that runs a political action
committee (PAC) with millions of dollars in assets. Under
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), it
65. Id. at 340 (discussing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)). As
the dissent pointed out, however, the Court held in Bellotti that corporations could
not be prohibited from spending money to affect the outcome of a statewide
referendum, while also recognizing that the issues involved in corporations
spending money to affect the outcomes of electoral campaigns are entirely
different, and that in electoral campaigns the potential for corruption could well
justify restrictions on corporate spending. Id. at 442–43 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26).
66. Id. at 364.
67. Id. at 365. The Court then took up the disclaimer and disclosure
requirements of BCRA, and found these constitutional. While they may burden
speech, they do not prevent anyone from speaking, and they promote the
government’s interests in having an informed electorate. Id. at 371. This portion of
the Court’s opinion was joined by all but Justice Thomas.
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could have used those assets to televise and promote
Hillary: The Movie wherever and whenever it wanted to. It
also could have spent unrestricted sums to broadcast
Hillary at any time other than the [thirty] days before the
last primary election. Neither Citizens United’s nor any
other corporation’s speech has been “banned”. . . .
The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its
iteration, and constant reiteration, of the proposition that
the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on
a speaker’s identity, including its “identity” as a
corporation. While that glittering generality has rhetorical
appeal, it is not a correct statement of the law . . . .68
....
. . . Congress has placed special limitations on campaign
spending by corporations ever since the passage of the
Tillman Act in 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. We have
unanimously concluded that this “reflects a permissible
assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the
electoral process,” FEC v. National Right to Work Comm.,
459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (NRWC), and have accepted the
“legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the
corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,”
id., at 209–[]10. The Court today rejects a century of
history when it treats the distinction between corporate and
individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born
of Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652 (1990). Relying largely on individual dissenting
opinions, the majority blazes through our precedents,
overruling or disavowing a body of case law including
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)
(WRTL), McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), FEC v.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (MCFL),

68. Id. at 394–95. As the dissent later discussed, limits on the speech of
students, inmates, members of the military, and civil service employees have been
upheld, as have limits on corporations and unions use of their general funds in
elections and for electioneering. See id. at 420–24 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, and California Medical Assn. v.
FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).”69
The dissent concluded:
Today’s decision is backwards in many senses. It elevates
the majority’s agenda over the litigants’ submissions, facial
attacks over as-applied claims, broad constitutional theories
over narrow statutory grounds, individual dissenting
opinions over precedential holdings, assertion over
tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality.
Our colleagues have arrived at the conclusion that Austin
must be overruled and that §203 is facially unconstitutional
only after mischaracterizing both the reach and rationale of
those authorities, and after bypassing or ignoring rules of
judicial restraint used to cabin the Court’s lawmaking
power.70
II. ANALYSIS OF CITIZENS UNITED
A. Constitutional Analysis
In assessing the Court’s constitutional analysis in Citizens United,
we stress at the outset that, in our view, the majority opinion is not
indicative of a deeply-held commitment to free speech rights,
notwithstanding the breadth of the holding and the over-wrought
language that the majority uses.71 As Erwin Chemerinsky has

69. Id. at 394–95 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 478–79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. For instance, the Court wrote, inaccurately, of Government “ban[ning] the

political speech of millions of associations of citizens” or that “[t]he censorship we
now confront is vast in its reach. The Government has ‘muffle[d] the voices that
best represent the most significant segments of the economy.’” Id. at 354 (citation
omitted). David Westbrook describes this latter language as “purple prose,” and
“such bad lawyering as to be professionally irresponsible,” given that no speech
had been “censored,” and given that “Hillary[: The Movie] was made and
distributed, and the question was whether Citizens United could pay for its
distribution using funds from its treasury,” rather than its substantial PAC to
distribute it. See David A. Westbrook, If Not a Commercial Republic? Political
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demonstrated, the Roberts Court has not generally displayed a robust
commitment to Free Speech rights, and has been hostile to them in
many instances.72 On the contrary, Chemerinsky argued that the
Roberts Court has routinely upheld restrictions on free speech when
the government is “functioning as an authoritarian institution” vis-àvis its employees,73 students,74 or prisoners.75 The Roberts Court, in
an opinion by the Chief Justice in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, upheld statutory prohibitions, including criminal sanctions,
on providing “expert advice,” “training,” “service,” and “personnel”
to groups designated as terrorists by the U.S. Government.76 That
holding came in a case where multiple NGOs and individuals sought
to provide training in human rights advocacy and peacekeeping to
Kurds living in Turkey and Tamils living in Sri Lanka, in part so they
could bring human rights complaints to the United Nations.77
Moreover, in two campaign finance cases where the effect of a
statute was to increase the amount of money available to a
financially-disfavored candidate—and thus, by the Court’s rationale
in Citizens’ United, to increase the amount of speech—the Roberts
Court ruled the statutes unconstitutional. In one case, Davis v.
Federal Election Commission, the ruling was justified by rejecting as
discriminatory the BCRA-defined subsidy to the financially
disadvantaged candidate, and only to that candidate, in reaction to an
opponent contributing $350,000 or more of personal funds to his or
Economy in the United States After Citizens United, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 35,
44 (2011).
72. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723,
725 (2011).
73. Id. (discussing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that there
is no First Amendment protection for the speech of government employees in the
scope of their employment-related duties, where supervising district attorney
concluded a government witness was lying about a criminal matter, and provided
that evidence to the defendant’s attorney as he thought constitutionally required,
and where the district attorney was subsequently demoted and not promoted)).
74. Id. at 727 (discussing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (restricting
student speech at school event when the speech, a banner with the inscription
“Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” could reasonably be viewed as promoting illegal drug use)).
75. Id. at 728 (discussing Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (upholding
prison regulation prohibiting inmates from having access to newspapers,
magazines, or photographs).
76. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
77. See id. at 2712–14, 2723–24.
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her own campaign.78 In a second case decided after Citizens United,
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Fund PAC v. Bennett, the
same majority that had decided Citizens United found
unconstitutional an Arizona statute that increased the state subsidy to
a financially disadvantaged candidate, subject to a fairly low cap
(three times the regular subsidy), where her opponent contributed
private funds to his or her own campaign or where independent
expenditures by sympathetic PACs exceeded the cap.79
Construing these two cases together with Citizens United, one sees
a pattern where the Court is deeply unsympathetic to the view that
money is speech and thus protected by the First Amendment where
increased public funds help to equalize candidates’ resources. But
where increased private funds could be used to the advantage of
candidates supported by wealthy entities such as corporations, the
Court has used rhetorical devotion to the norms of the First
Amendment to support those electoral advantages. As Chemerinsky
stated, what is evident in these cases is not a “commit[ment] to free
speech,” but rather “a Court that is hostile to campaign finance
laws—especially those restricting spending by corporations and the
rich.”80
Despite the Roberts Court’s inconsistent approach to the First
Amendment, Citizens United might still be defended on the grounds
that there are circumstances in which it is necessary to permit
corporations to speak on behalf of their constituents. In the context of
electoral participation, this argument is weak as a matter of corporate
law, as we argue below.81 But it may also overstate the constitutional
protection that should be given to “corporate speech” generally.
The theoretical “corporate right to speak” is not well grounded in
First Amendment theory, according to the late constitutional and
political theorist Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin identified three core
justifications for broadly protecting political speech rights: to meet
the need for an informed electorate; to protect the status, integrity and
moral development of citizens as equal partners in the political
process; and to promote the robust criticism of government as a
78. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
79. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806

(2011).
80. Chemerinsky, supra note 72, at 734.
81. See infra notes 84–94 and accompanying text.
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contribution to its honesty and integrity.82 None of these justifications
are advanced, Dworkin argued, by “allowing rich corporations to
swamp elections with money.”83
In short, the Citizens United Court reached out, aggressively, to
answer questions that had not been posed by the litigants. It did so in
order to reject decades of prior Court precedent in a way that is
inconsistent with First Amendment theory so as to give even more
political power to entities that already command enormous power.
While one can ask as a philosophical matter what speech rights
corporations ought to have, in this electoral context the answer by the
Court seems purely political: they ought to have the right to spend
whatever they want to influence elections.
It may well be that most individual companies will stay out of the
messy, noisy, and potentially risky business of trying to shape
individual elections directly, preferring to focus their electoral efforts
through associations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. From
the perspective of individual legislators making decisions about
policies to promote or resist, however, whether ads are directly
supported by one company or indirectly supported by many through
the Chamber of Commerce makes little difference. The point is that
the views of the “business community” are well known, are
communicated early and often through lobbying efforts, and must
now be of even greater concern to legislators (and judges in states
where judges are elected) after Citizens United than before.
B. Corporate Law Analysis
Turning to the more circumscribed field of corporate law, a first
point is that one fundamental policy goal thought to be advanced by
campaign finance law from the early 1900s has been controlling the
agency costs of managers making campaign contributions with other
peoples’ money.84 Derived from core principal-agent concerns,85 this
82. Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, May 13, 2010, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
2010/may/13/decision-threatens-democracy.
83. Id.
84. See Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs,
and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871 (2004) (using historical research to
show that as early as the Tillman Act of 1907, which prohibited corporations from
making direct campaign contributions, an animating concern was to protect
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policy goal provides a basis for requiring the political activities of
corporations and unions generally to be conducted through
specifically-funded PACs with clear financial records. It also
recognizes the First Amendment rights of “dissenting” shareholders
not to have the corporation’s resources put in service of electoral
goals with which they disagree. Such a view was forcefully
articulated by Justice Brennan in his concurrence in Austin, for
instance.86
From a corporate law perspective one might respond that managers
have broad discretion to make many decisions, expenditures, and
contributions of a political nature, from contributing company
philanthropic resources to the Metropolitan Opera rather than to the
Urban League to deciding to support the lobbying efforts against
climate change of the Chamber of Commerce.87 Thus, one might ask,

shareholders from corporate managers using “their money” to advance political
perspectives with which the shareholders would not necessarily agree).
85. Winkler also recognizes that from the late 1800s there has been a concern
with electoral corruption and/or the perception of corruption that could occur were
corporations permitted to make direct campaign contributions or independent
electioneering expenditures. His argument is that the agency concerns have always
been at least as relevant to the enacting legislatures, including the Congress in 1907
that enacted the Tillman Act. Id. at 871.
86. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 677 (Brennan,
J., concurring) (“But just as speech interests are at their zenith in [speech about
electoral campaigns], so too are the interests of unwilling Chamber members and
corporate shareholders forced to subsidize that speech.”). See also Victor Brudney,
Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights under the First Amendment, 91
YALE L.J. 235 (1981). Arguably this concern is given insufficient weight in
campaign finance law, since companies electioneering expenditures are only
limited in the thirty and sixty day period before primary and general elections. If
so, then Citizens United just made things worse.
87. Indeed, one might argue that charitable contributions do raise agency and
associational concerns similar to those raised by companies’ electoral involvement,
precisely because of the political implications of those contributions and the
increased heterogeneity of shareholders’ interests with respect to them. It is for this
reason that companies’ charitable contributions have been controversial as a
corporate governance matter, a point John Coates made in Congressional testimony
concerning proposed legislative responses to Citizens United. Additional
Discussion of H.R. 5175, the DISCLOSE Act, Democracy Is Strengthened by
Casting Light on Spending in Elections Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 111th
Cong. (2010) (statement of John C. Coates IV, Professor of Law & Economics,
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why should electoral expenditures be understood to be any different?
One response is that the electoral context has been recognized by the
courts to be the most central for the exercise of core First
Amendment values, which is why restrictions on the political speech
rights of individuals are given the most searching analysis in this
context.88 Conversely, corporations and unions are not members of
the polity with voting rights, so their exercise of First Amendment
rights in the electoral context has been understood to be properly
limited (at least until Citizens United). As stated by the Court in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, which upheld a corporation’s
right to spend money to promote its views on a statewide referendum,
“our consideration of a corporation’s right to speak on issues of
general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite
different context of participation in a political campaign for election
to public office,” where the interests in preserving public confidence
in government and protecting dissenting shareholders are
“weighty.”89
A further response is to argue that many other business decisions
with political implications, such as engaging in lobbying or
supporting trade associations that engage in lobbying, at least can be
expected to contribute directly to the company’s welfare. While some
shareholders, and perhaps even a substantial minority, may not agree
with particular lobbying efforts or trade association activities, they
can be safely assumed to share a general preference that the company
prospers. (This statement needs to be understood with caveats, since
many shareholders today invest through pension funds or mutual
funds and may not know or approve of individual companies held by
the funds.) With electoral activity, such homogeneity evaporates. In
response to these concerns, Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson have
Harvard Law School) (citing Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate
Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV 1191 (2002)).
88. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that
“[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political
expression . . . .” ).
89. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978); see also id. at
787–88 (acknowledging that the interests in preserving public confidence in
government and protecting dissenting shareholders are “weighty . . . in the context
of partisan candidate elections . . . .”).
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proposed special decision-making rules for companies’ electoral
involvement to protect shareholders in light of Citizens United, since
to participate in the electoral process is not an ordinary business
decision and should be subject to heightened procedural
requirements.90 They suggest that shareholder input be required; that
there be a role for independent directors; and that there be real-time
disclosure of a company’s electoral involvement.91 Yet given how
insufficient the mechanisms of “corporate democracy” often are, it is
unlikely that even these heightened procedural protections would
mitigate all the associational concerns that Citizens United creates in
the corporate law arena.
But from one corporate law perspective Citizens United is
unexceptional: the Court treated the corporation as separate from the
individuals who contribute to it or can be said to comprise it
(managers, employees, shareholders, bond holders and/or other
capital providers). This statement should not be interpreted to say
that as a matter of First Amendment jurisprudence the majority
opinion is correct. It merely points out that the Court’s recognition of
the corporation as a distinct entity, separate from its constituents, is
standard corporate law doctrine. The Court was not always consistent
about this, criticizing Austin for “permit[ting] the Government to ban
the political speech of millions of associations of citizens,”92 which
not only looks through the corporation to one set of its constituents,
but mischaracterizes them.93 Yet the aspect of the opinion that is
profoundly troubling from a political or First Amendment
90. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:
Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010).
91. See id. at 84. It is perhaps also the case that charitable contributions should
be subjected to a similar regime, at the least involving much clearer disclosure of
the amounts and recipients of contributions. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s
Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 579 (1997).
92. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (emphasis added).
93. There are many ways to characterize corporations, but “associations of
citizens” is certainly distorted, and very often may be incorrect as a matter of fact,
since an increasing percentage of shares of corporations are held by institutions,
rather than “citizens,” including foreign institutions and foreign residents. Citizens
United, a non-profit association formed to promote the political views of its
members, can be characterized as an “association of citizens,” but General Motors
cannot be so characterized.
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perspective—that the corporate entity as a separate entity has been
imbued with electoral free speech rights—is unproblematic as a
matter of corporate law doctrine. In contrast, one disconcerting
aspect of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.94 is its failure to treat the corporation as separate from
the people who act for it. It is to that opinion that this discussion now
turns.
III. KIOBEL AND CORPORTATIONS’ LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Kiobel I95 is one of a number of opinions from the Second Circuit
arising out of international human rights challenges to the alleged
cooperation of the Royal Dutch Shell Group of companies with the
Nigerian government to violently suppress political opposition to
Shell’s activities in Nigeria. One of these cases, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.,96 established important principles that expand
possible ATS liability in the United States. In that opinion, the
Second Circuit held that personal jurisdiction over the Royal Dutch
Petroleum Company and the Shell Transport and Trading Company
(together, Royal Dutch Shell), Dutch and English holding companies
respectively, was proper in the United States, given the ongoing
presence of Royal Dutch Shell’s investor relations office in New
York.97 It further held that dismissal for reasons of forum non
conveniens was improper in light of the consideration that should be
given to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.98 Kiobel I and Kiobel II
clearly have the opposite import, dramatically contracting the scope
of potential ATS liability.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
Id.
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 95–96.
Id. at 99–100. This case was settled on the eve of trial for $ 15.5 million, a
large portion being contributed to a Nigerian NGO to use for economic
development purposes. For an overview of the cases against Royal Dutch Shell, see
Wiwa et al v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/wiwa-v.-royal-dutch-petroleum#files
(last visited Nov. 14, 2013). The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) has acted
as co-counsel in all of these cases.
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A. Facts and Legal Background of Kiobel
The facts underlying all of the Royal Dutch/Shell litigation arise
out of the Nigerian government’s suppression of the Ogoni people’s
political activism in response to Royal Dutch Shell’s (and other oil
companies’) drilling in the Ogoni region of the Niger River delta in
Nigeria. According to the plaintiffs (and confirmed by a number of
international human rights and environmental organizations), the oil
development and extraction activities in the Ogoni region since 1958
have involved decades of extensive gas flaring, enormous
environmental damage to lands and waters, and forcible resettling of
villages. These activities, which plaintiffs in both cases allege to have
depended on coercive appropriation of Ogoni land, were said to have
provided little or no economic benefits to the Ogoni people but rather
to have destroyed their land, water and air.99
The Ogoni people’s resistance to these activities developed slowly,
but eventually became highly visible through actions of the
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by
Ken Saro-Wiwa, an internationally-recognized writer. The
complaints in both Wiwa and Kiobel allege that Royal Dutch Shell
Group’s wholly-owned Nigerian subsidiary, the Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. (“Shell Nigeria”), eventually
encouraged the Nigerian government in its violent suppression of
Ogoni political activism. The complaint in Wiwa contended that Shell
Nigeria recruited the Nigerian government to arrest Ken Saro-Wiwa
and other leaders of MOSOP on false charges, falsely imprison them,
torture them, and try them and put them to death, all on false
evidence; and that various other members of the Ogoni community
were beaten and shot.100 Similarly, the complaint in Kiobel alleged
that Shell Nigeria aided the Nigerian military in its egregious human
rights abuses, including the beating and raping of villagers, false
arrests, torture and extrajudicial killings.101 The specific allegations
against Shell Nigeria in Kiobel were that it supported the military’s
efforts by giving soldiers food, helping with transportation, allowing

99. The facts discussed here are taken from the discussion of the facts in Wiwa,
226 F.3d at 92–94.
100. Id. at 92.
101. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (U.S. 2013).
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Shell’s property to be used as a staging ground for the military’s
activities, and paying the soldiers.102
The ATS provided the subject matter jurisdictional basis for
plaintiffs to bring both Wiwa and Kiobel in the United States. This
statute, enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, grants original
jurisdiction in the United States District Courts over “any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”103 The statute was virtually
ignored for almost 200 years. Then, in 1980, the Second Circuit
upheld the assertion of ATS jurisdiction in a case challenging a
Paraguayan police officer’s actions in torturing to death the brother
of the plaintiff.104 Fifteen years later, the Second Circuit decided for
the first time that private actors, as well as state actors, can be
reached in ATS cases.105 Since then, the ATS has been the statutory
basis for a wide range of cases being brought in U.S. courts alleging
that the actions of U.S. and foreign multinationals have violated
international human rights law.106 The Supreme Court gave cautious
encouragement to this use of the statute in 2004 when it decided in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the ATS is a basis for subject matter
jurisdiction in the United States, and that the substantive contours of
the cause of action are defined by jus cogens norms of international
human rights law, as incorporated into U.S. federal common law.107

102. Id.
103. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2008). “Alien Torts Claim Act”

and “Alien Torts Statute,” or “ATS,” are used interchangeably.
104. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). At the time of the
case the police officer was living in New York, which is why the court had
personal jurisdiction over him.
105. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
106. In order to bring a foreign citizen or multinational into court in the United
States the assertion of personal jurisdiction must be consistent with due process.
See Williams, supra note 1, for further discussion of this point and for discussion
of the numerous procedural and substantive difficulties ATS litigation presents. For
a comprehensive overview of the legal developments underlying use of the ATS as
a mechanism of corporate accountability, written by one of the attorneys who is cocounsel on many of these cases, see Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The
Door is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
533 (2004).
107. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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While the ATS is important in allowing these cases to be heard in
U.S. courts, there have been very few successful outcomes against
corporations where cases have proceeded to a final judgment or
settlement.108 Notwithstanding these meager positive results to date,
the use of the ATS as a mechanism for bringing corporate
accountability claims is only fifteen years old. Given how long
litigation takes in the United States, that is a relatively short period of
time for the development of a new area of law. Moreover—and this
may be of little comfort to unsuccessful plaintiffs—at the least ATS
claims allow the facts of the alleged corporate activities to be brought
into the open through court-monitored discovery, creating an
important mechanism for promoting transparency and corporate
accountability. The decision of the Second Circuit in Kiobel I is a
significant defeat for claimants, however, and its affirmance on other
grounds by the U.S. Supreme Court may well portend the end of ATS
108. See Doe I. v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), case dismissed on stipulation upon
settlement 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). This case, challenging the Unocal
company’s cooperation with the Burmese government’s forced resettlement of
villages and use of forced labor to build a pipeline to transport natural gas, was
settled on favorable terms, including substantial funds to an NGO working to
improve local economic conditions. See supra note 98, for a discussion of how
Wiwa was settled. Two other cases returned outcomes for plaintiffs after trial:
Chowdhurry v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131483
(2009) ($1.5 million torture verdict against defendant); Licea v. Curacao Drydock
Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (judgment against defendant in labor
trafficking case). In addition, there have been a number of successful ATS cases
brought against government actors. See, e.g., Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1259
(11th Cir. 2006) (a jury awarded $54,600,000 to Salvadoran refugees who claimed
they were tortured by the El Salvador Military); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402
F.3d 1148, 1151 (11th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff administrator of the estate of a Chilean
economist who was murdered by Chilean Military Officers, was awarded $3
million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages); Abebe-Jira
v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1996) (Plaintiffs, former Ethiopian
prisoners who sued the Ethiopian government alleging torture, were each awarded
$200,000 in compensatory damages, and $300,000 in punitive damages); Alejandre
v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253–54 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (Plaintiffs, the
estates of United States citizens who were killed by the Cuban Air Force as they
were flying to Cuba on a humanitarian mission, were awarded $45.9 million); In re
Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp 1460, 1463–64 (D. Haw. 1995)
(Plaintiffs, victims of torture under the Former President of the Philippines,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, were awarded $1.2 billion in exemplary damages).
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corporate accountability litigation, since (a) it would be the highly
unusual case in which individual corporate employees acting in
foreign countries would be susceptible to the personal jurisdiction of
U.S. courts, and (b) even if they were, they could not be sued if their
actions took place outside of the United States.
B. The Kiobel I Decision
In an opinion by Judge Cabranes that was joined by Chief Judge
Jacobs, the Second Circuit held that a corporation as a juridical entity
cannot be sued under the ATS.109 The court stated:
From the beginning, however, the principle of individual
liability for violations of international law has been limited
to natural persons—not “juridical” persons such as
corporations—because the moral responsibility for a crime
so heinous and unbounded as to rise to the level of an
“international crime” has rested solely with the individual
men and women who have perpetuated it.110
The court recognized that “nothing in this opinion limits or
forecloses suits under the ATS against the individual perpetrators of
violations of customary international law—including the employees,
managers, officers, and directors of a corporation . . . .”111 But it held
that “insofar as plaintiffs bring claims under the ATS against
corporations, plaintiffs fail to allege violations of the law of nations,
and plaintiffs’ claims fall outside the limited jurisdiction provided by
the ATS.”112
A key aspect of the court’s rationale was that “international law,
and not domestic law, governs the scope of liability for violations of
customary international law under the ATS.”113 In seeking to define
the customary international law applicable to the question of
corporate liability, the court canvassed widely accepted sources of
international legal norms, including treaties, prior tribunals
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 126.
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(especially the Nuremberg trials of I.G. Farben officials for their role
in collaborating with the Nazis); other tribunals; and the writings of
recognized international law scholars. It concluded that “customary
international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate
liability for international crimes, and no international tribunal has
ever held a corporation liable for a violation of the law of nations.”114
In concurring in the judgment of dismissal of the plaintiff’s
claims,115 but not in the court’s rationale, Judge Leval wrote that the
majority’s analysis went astray in looking to international law to
define both the substantive wrong and the proper procedures for
enforcement.116 Customary international law defines the actions that
are violations of jus cogens norms—that is, norms that are specific,
universal, and obligatory.117 In that sense, the majority in Kiobel I
was correct that “international law . . . governs the scope of
liability. . . .”118 Yet, according to Judge Leval, international law then
leaves to domestic law questions of enforcement, including whether
an alleged violation can be addressed by criminal enforcement or by
private civil litigation.119 Unlike the United States, most countries in
the world do not impose criminal liability on juridical entities such as
corporations either for crimes defined by domestic statutes or
international law. This denial of corporate criminal liability is
premised on the belief that an artificial entity cannot have a criminal
intent, and that criminal punishment of a juridical entity cannot serve
114. Id. at 120.
115. In a prior opinion, the Second Circuit had held that in order to establish

liability for aiding and abetting violations of international human rights law,
plaintiffs must establish that the defendants acted with a purpose to bring about the
violation, and that merely knowing that a violation was likely to result was
insufficient. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d
244 (2d Cir. 2009). Judge Leval concurred in the judgment of dismissal in Kiobel I
because the evidence as alleged did not show that Shell Nigerian officials acted
with that purpose. This aspect of Second Circuit law has recently been challenged
in an opinion that also rejects the Kiobel I majority’s ruling on corporate immunity.
See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Inc., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that a
“knowledge” mens rea is sufficient under customary international law to establish
aiding and abetting liability).
116. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
117. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
118. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 126.
119. Id. at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
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the “punitive objectives of punishment.”120 That, according to Judge
Leval, is why, for example, the Nuremberg Tribunal did not assert
criminal jurisdiction over I.G. Farben as a company.121 And yet, “[i]n
contrast, the imposition of civil liability on corporations serves
perfectly the objective of civil liability to compensate victims for the
wrongs inflicted on them and is practiced everywhere in the
world.”122 While the United States is unique in granting its national
courts jurisdiction for civil enforcement of violations of customary
international law, Congress has clearly done so in the ATS, according
to Judge Leval,123 and that Congressional mandate must be respected.
The holding in Kiobel I disclaiming the existence of corporate civil
liability for violations of customary international law has been
explicitly rejected in two recent Circuit Court opinions, one by Judge
Rogers of the D.C. Circuit in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.124 and the
other by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit in Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Co.125 Both opinions agree with Judge Leval’s
analysis, specifically that international law defines the scope of the
substantive wrong, and domestic law the mode of enforcement.126
Judge Rogers explained:
Although customary international law provides rules for
determining whether international disapprobation attaches
to certain types of conduct, such as torture, extrajudicial
killing, prolonged arbitrary detention, or aiding and
abetting the same, one could not expect . . . states out of “a
sense of legal obligation,” to produce detailed rules of

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 183.
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(challenging the alleged actions of Exxon Mobil acting in collaboration with the
Government of Indonesia to suppress political activism in Aceh, Indonesia by
engaging in excessive force, extrajudicial killings, forced resettlements, and other
violations of plaintiffs’ international human rights).
125. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir.
2011) (challenging the use of child labor on Firestone’s Liberian rubber plantation
on behalf of 23 Liberian children).
126. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at 42–43; Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017.
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procedure and evidence on matters like res judicata,
burdens of proof, and respondeat superior.127
Moreover, both opinions asserted that an important factual premise
of the Kiobel I court was wrong. The Kiobel I majority was
convinced its analysis was correct by what it interpreted as a lack of
precedent for punishing a corporation, rather than its employees, for
violations of customary international law, even in such egregious
examples as chemical company I.G. Farben’s collaboration with the
Nazis. In fact, Judge Posner pointed out in Flomo, corporations such
as I.G. Farben were punished: they were dissolved and on the
authority of customary international law.128 But he would not have
been troubled even if there had been no such punishment: “And
suppose no corporation had ever been punished for violating
customary international law. There is always a first time for litigation
to enforce a norm; there has to be.”129 The Exxon Mobil court, in
scholarly detail, also recounted the punishments that had been levied
against corporations found to have collaborated with the Nazis,
including dissolution, and that these punishments were specifically
tied to violations of international law.130
This question of the liability of a corporation, as a juridical entity,
for violations of customary international law has an
“intersectionality” that led the Kiobel I majority astray, in our
opinion. Does the resolution of the case really involve only
international law, as the Kiobel I majority stated,131 or does it involve
the intersection of international law with domestic tort law and
agency law? The Exxon Mobil majority recognized these other bodies
127. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at 42–43; see also id. at 50 (claims of corporate
immunity for international human rights violations “overlook[] the key distinction
between norms of conduct and remedies . . . .”).
128. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017.
129. Id. (emphasis in original).
130. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at 52–53, (citing, inter alia, Jonathan A. Bush, The
Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What
Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1098 (2009)).
131. The opinion in Exxon Mobil detailed several ways in which the Kiobel
majority misinterpreted international law on the question of corporate liability. See,
Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at 40–43, 51–55. See also id. at 51 (asserting that “the
technical accoutrements to the ATS cause of action, such as corporate liability and
agency law, are to be drawn from federal common law . . . .”).
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of law as relevant. In examining the history of the ATS, the court
found that “[b]y 1789, corporate liability in tort was an accepted
principle of tort law in the United States.”132 Indeed, the Exxon Mobil
majority concluded:
The law of the United States has been uniform since its
founding that corporations can be held liable for the torts
committed by their agents. This is confirmed in
international practice, both in treaties and in legal systems
throughout the world. Given that the law of every
jurisdiction in the United States and of every civilized
nation, and the law of numerous international treaties,
provide that corporations are responsible for their torts, it
would create a bizarre anomaly to immunize corporations
from liability for the conduct of their agents in lawsuits
brought for “shockingly egregious violations of universally
recognized principles of international law.”133
In fact, the question that the Kiobel I majority did not address is
precisely the one that the Exxon Mobil opinion highlights: if the
individual officers or directors can be held liable for international
human rights violations, as Kiobel I recognized, on what theory
would the corporation itself not be vicariously liable? After all, the
issue before the court was not the direct liability of the company, that
is, the liability of the company based on official actions of the board
132. Id. at 47.
133. Id. at 57 (quoting Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1983)). The Exxon

Mobil decision was a 2-1 opinion, in which Circuit Judge Rogers was joined by
Circuit Judge Tatel, and Circuit Judge Kavanaugh dissented. Judge Kavanaugh’s
dissent was based on four, independent grounds: (1) The ATS does not apply
outside the United States, given the presumption against extraterritorial application
of statutes; (2) the ATS does not apply to claims against corporations; (3) the ATS
must be construed consistently with the TVPA, which clearly excludes juridical
persons as defendants, see supra note 10; and (4) extending ATS jurisdiction in this
case would be in conflict with the determination of the Executive Branch that
Indonesia is an important ally of the United States and jurisdiction should not be so
extended. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at 72–73 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Judge
Kavanaugh’s rationale for not extending ATS to claims against corporations is
based on, and quotes with approval, the rationale of the Kiobel majority. See id. at
83–84.
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of directors, acting as a board. Rather, the question was the vicarious
liability of the Nigerian subsidiary for the torts of its employees,
based on the very well established common law theory of respondeat
superior. Respondeat superior is a strict form of vicarious liability of
the company for the torts and other wrongs committed by its
employees in the scope of their business—strict because even if the
employees are acting contrary to company policy or direct
instructions, the company will be vicariously liable for their
actions.134
A further, separate question is the liability of the parent companies,
the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (a Netherlands corporation)
and Shell Transport and Trading Co., PLC (an English corporation
until 2005, when it was reincorporated in the Netherlands), for the
actions of the Nigerian subsidiary, which, as the case was framed,
would require piercing the corporate veil under the law of the state of
incorporation.135 So to ask if the two Royal Dutch Shell companies
can be directly liable under international law, as the Second Circuit
has framed the issue, is to ask the wrong question. The questions
should be: can the Nigerian subsidiary corporation be vicariously
liable for this type of wrong under Nigerian law136 if its employees
are found to have committed international human rights violations? If
it is vicariously liable, is there any reason to pierce the corporate veil
to reach the parent companies? As this line of inquiry shows,
ultimately finding ATS liability over the parent companies will be
difficult, but not because corporations as juridical entities are not
amenable to suit under the ATS.
C. Kiobel II
On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
judgment of the Second Circuit. In four separate opinions, the nine
justices relied solely on the extraterritoriality issue that the Court had
134. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (2006).
135. As noted in the paragraph above, the Royal Dutch Shell parent company

could theoretically be directly liable if actions and decisions of the board were
responsible for the alleged violations of the plaintiffs’ international human rights,
which would be a separate basis other than piercing on which the parent could be
liable.
136. New York choice of law rules would apply and would dictate the use
Nigerian law on respondeat superior would prevail.
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addressed in reargument,137 and none of the opinions directly
addressed the corporate liability rationale that had been the basis of
the Second Circuit’s 2-1 ruling. Writing for the Court (and joined by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), Chief Justice Roberts
framed the question as “not whether petitioners have stated a proper
claim under the ATS, but whether a claim may reach conduct
occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.”138 The Court turned
to “a canon of statutory interpretation known as the presumption
against extraterritorial application,” which “provides that ‘[w]hen a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it
has none.’”139 Examining the “text, history, and purposes of the
ATS,”140 the Court found no basis to derogate from this presumption.
It concluded that “all the relevant conduct took place outside the
United States,” and that the claims did not “touch and concern the
territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality.”141
Justices Kennedy and Alito each wrote a brief concurrence. The
former emphasized the fact-specific nature of the Court’s holding,
noting that in future cases “the proper implementation of the
presumption against extraterritorial application may require some
further elaboration and explanation.”142 The latter wrote separately
“to set out the broader standard that [led him] to the conclusion that
this case falls within the scope of the presumption,” emphasizing that
the domestic conduct alleged in this case did not fall within “the
‘focus’ of congressional concern” in 1789—”violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy”—
but that it might in future cases.143
Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan) filed a lengthy concurrence. Although unwilling to rely on
the presumption against extraterritoriality, he agreed with the Court’s
conclusion that, in Kiobel, “the parties and relevant conduct lack
sufficient ties to the United States for the ATS to provide
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
Id. at 1664.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1665.
Id. at 1669.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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jurisdiction.”144 Specifically, he pointed out, this is what some have
called a “foreign-cubed” case: “The plaintiffs are not United States
nationals . . . The conduct at issue took place abroad. And the
plaintiffs allege, not that the defendants directly engaged in acts of
torture, genocide, or the equivalent, but that they helped others (who
are not American nationals) to do so.”145 In the future, however,
cases presenting a more direct connection with the United States,
including conduct by a defendant that “substantially and adversely
affects an important American national interest,” might warrant a
different conclusion.146
Although none of the opinions addressed the corporate liability
issue directly, both the Court and Justice Breyer commented in
passing on the status of corporate defendants, in ways that do not
conflict with the Second Circuit’s decision. The Chief Justice’s
opinion for the Court, immediately after posing the question of
whether the claims asserted “touch and concern the territory of the
United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality,” observed that “[c]orporations are often
present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere
corporate presence suffices.”147 In a generally parallel vein, Justice
Breyer noted at the end of his opinion that the defendants “are two
foreign corporations” whose “only presence in the United States
consists of an office in New York City (actually owned by a separate
but affiliated company).”148 He concluded that, “under these
circumstances, even if the New York office were a sufficient basis for
asserting general [personal] jurisdiction . . . it would ‘reach too far
to say’ that such ‘mere corporate presence suffices.’”149 Thus, the
Court and the concurring justices apparently agreed that corporate
presence, a traditional linchpin of personal jurisdiction, cannot by
itself create subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.
At the end of the Kiobel saga, we know two things: (1) that a
majority of today’s Supreme Court does not believe that the ATS can
be applied to extraterritorial conduct, though at least four justices are
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1678.
Id. at 1671.
Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
Id. at 1677 (Breyer, J. concurring).
Id. at 1678 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
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open to reassessing that conclusion on different facts; and (2) that it
is still the law of the Second Circuit that corporations cannot be sued
under the ATS, even for the torts of their employees and agents. As
we will argue in the remainder of the article, these results contribute
to a strong negative message about the accountability of global
corporations for socially irresponsible behavior outside their home
countries.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Supreme
Court said, for the first time, that “[a] corporation is an artificial
person, existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with certain
power and franchises” by state law.150 It was this aspect of a
corporation’s existence, its artificial personhood, having only the
powers that states decide are necessary for it to fulfill its economic
purpose, that Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized in his dissent from
the recognition of corporate free speech rights in First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti.151 Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that the
proper constitutional inquiry was to “seek to determine which
constitutional protections are ‘incidental to [the corporation’s] very
existence.’”152 That inquiry led him to view as essential the
constitutional right to Due Process for the protection of property,
and—for media corporations—the First Amendment right to express
political opinions. But other liberty interests, such as First
Amendment rights for corporate political speech generally, he
thought not only unnecessary for corporations to advance their
economic interests, but dangerous. In prescient terms he stated that:
A State grants to a business corporation the blessings of
potentially perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its
efficiency as an economic entity. It might reasonably be
concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the
economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political
150. Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 667
(1819).
151. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823–826 (1978) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
152. Id. at 823 (quoting Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636).
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sphere. Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of
political expression are not at all necessary to effectuate the
purposes for which States permit commercial corporations
to exist. So long as the Judicial Branches of the State and
Federal Governments remain open to protect the
corporation’s interest in its property, it has no need, though
it may have the desire, to petition the political branches for
similar protection.153
We have come far from 1819 and the Dartmouth College Court’s
view of the corporation as an “artificial person.” As the Kiobel I
majority recognized, the idea of the corporation “as ‘persons’ with
duties, liability and rights . . . continues to evolve in complex and
unexpected ways.”154 With this view untouched by the Supreme
Court, we have arrived at the point—at least in the Second Circuit—
of looking through the corporation to its constituent employees,
including directors and officers, treating the corporation itself as
“invisible [and] intangible”155—but only for the purposes of
adjudicating its international human rights obligations. If that
happens, what the Court will have constructed is a tragically ironic
jurisprudence that ignores the corporate entity in the context of
international accountability but recognizes it for every other purpose,
from limiting liability to tax avoidance156 to exercising broad
political rights.
The general point we would emphasize is that the existing
mechanisms for corporations to exercise political power in the United
States are varied and extremely robust, while the mechanisms for
imposing accountability—certainly accountability for international
153. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 825–26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
154. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 117 n.11 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310

(2010)).
155. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636.
156. One situation in which the separate existence of parent and subsidiary
corporations is recognized is in inter-company sales and transfers of intellectual
property, both areas exploited by sophisticated multinationals to reduce their tax
liabilities on a worldwide basis. See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, G.E.’s Strategies
Let it Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, at A1 (“Although the top
corporate tax rate in the United States is [thirty-five] percent, one of the highest in
the world, companies have been increasingly using a maze of shelters, tax credits
and subsidies to pay far less.”).
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human rights violations—are attenuated and insufficient. Even before
Citizens United, corporations had broad authority to run political
advertisements (just not in the months before a primary or general
election), to establish political action committees (PACs), to engage
in political advertising, and to use the funds and other organizational
resources of the firm to communicate with shareholders and
employees and encourage them to support the PAC. Corporations,
because of their broad free speech rights, have unlimited power to
engage in “issue advertising.” Even blatantly self-interested,
misleading advertisements by corporations and corporate-funded
think tanks on such topics as climate change or “clean coal” cannot
be excluded from the marketplace of ideas because of how the First
Amendment has been construed.157 Corporations have broad
constitutional authority to engage in lobbying, and do so
prodigiously.158 One would expect the lobbying efforts of
corporations to be self-interested, and corporate law might demand it
to be. But as we have seen in the United States in recent years, the
self-interested lobbying of financial, oil, gas, coal, insurance, and
pharmaceutical corporations has permeated the political environment
and has created difficulties for advancing legislation in the public
interest even where a majority of Americans support that
legislation.159 In this context, giving corporations additional,
unrestrained powers to shape electoral outcomes is not only
157. See Jane Mayer, Covert Operations, NEW YORKER, Aug. 2010 (describing
in depth how the billionaire Koch Brothers have used the resources of their oil, gas
and pipeline corporation, Koch Industries (which is one of the top ten air polluters
in the country) to lobby government, to fight legislation related to environmental
protection and climate change, and to establish anti-regulatory think tanks such as
the Mercatus Institute at George Mason University Law School, “Citizens for a
Better Environment,” and other such deceptively-named entities to fight
environmental regulations).
158. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & DOUGLAS DOWSON, MANHATTAN INST.
LEGAL POL’Y, CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING: WHY THE NEW CRITICS ARE
WRONG, (2012), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/lpr_15.pdf (reporting that
corporations spent $6.8 billion on lobbying during the 2010 election cycle); Center
for Responsive Politics, Influence & Lobbying: Organization Profiles, available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/index.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (listing
several major corporations as among the leading spenders on lobbying).
159. See generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER TAKE ALL
POLITICS (2010) (describing how policy positions supported by a majority of
Americans fail to become law today given the influence of money in politics).
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unnecessary, but deeply problematic, leading America away from
any vision of democracy that the Founders would recognize, in our
view.
The particular problem for the promotion of CSR is the shrinking
of the shadow of the law. As we have documented elsewhere, CSR
participants and stakeholders cite many possible motivations for CRS
activity.160 They range from a good-faith belief in improving the
world to a more cynical concern about image management.161 But
many people in the field put primary emphasis on another motive:
preempting “hard” regulation. 162 That is, companies engage in oftenelaborate “soft” self-regulatory activities in order to head off
demands for national and international law makers to impose
traditional legal controls. In this important sense, companies pursue
CSR in the shadow of the law, both current and prospective.
One example of this that we have studied in detail is the Equator
Principles, a self-imposed (and largely unenforceable) regime of
social and environmental review that has been agreed to by the large
multinational banks that finance huge infrastructure projects in the
developing world.163 In the view of many of those who have
participated in this endeavor, a primary has been to a build a case that
“hard” regulation by national and international authorities is
unnecessary.164 Almost all of the relevant stakeholders believe that
the Equator Principles are doing some good, at least by making the
banks stop and study the potential social and environmental
consequences of the projects they fund.165 If so, then any motivation
is welcome.
Good-faith belief in CSR and the need to manage a company’s
image are constants, motives that will exist (or not) regardless of
external influences like legal policy. But corporate executives and
boards will pursue soft-law CSR solutions to preempt hard law only
if the threat of hard law is real. If, on the contrary, the Supreme Court
takes away a historically significant means of enforcing
responsibility for human rights violations, then a potentially
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Conley & Williams, Engage, supra note 1, at 20–21.
Id. 13–18.
Id. at 20; Conley & Williams, Global Banks, supra note 1, at 564–65.
Conley & Williams, Global Banks, supra note 1, at 542–49.
Id. at 564–65.
Id. at 567–71.
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important motivation for voluntary CSR activities will have been
undermined. Since the Court has, at the same time, expanded
corporations’ ability to influence the political process, that effect will
have been multiplied. The shadow of the law will diminish in extent
even as the power of corporations to influence the law’s content will
grow.
CONCLUSION
Corporate social responsibility can be interpreted as yet another
example of market self-regulation, asking corporations to volunteer
to recognize and address their negative externalities in ways beyond
what is required by law. With respect to core financial issues, the
track record of devolving the task of advancing public welfare to
corporate self-regulation does not inspire confidence. Consider the
example of derivatives, which eventually undermined global
financial stability in spectacular fashion. Why should we expect
better in the case of corporate social responsibility? On the contrary,
the same fragility and insufficiency seem likely. This skepticism only
grows in the context of Citizens United and Kiobel, which,
respectively, expanded the ability of corporations to exert political
influence and narrowed the mechanisms of potential corporate
accountability. In a globalizing world, recognizing the corporation as
a “juridical person” for every purpose other than for legal
accountability for international human rights violations cannot be
brought into balance with the voluntary constraints of corporate
social responsibility.

